By: Abdul Aziz al-Assali

The black September 21st coup

First: One clarity and interpretation:

1- The Yemeni Islah Party, along with all the good national forces, announced its explicit rejection of the Houthi militia’s coup against the state, which accepts only one interpretation, embodying its position practically by declaring that it “aligns itself with political legitimacy,” in defense of the people’s consensus, the constitution, and the nation’s will represented in a direct free election of its political leadership, it is a position in which there is no flattery or armistice.

2- A unified national position:

The Islah Party, along with all the national forces, announced its condemnation of the coup in all Governorates of the Republic, using all peaceful means represented in statements, rallies and press writings.

3- Friday of alignment:

It is worth noting that the Islah Party mobilized all national forces on July 12, 2014, three days after what befallen Amran, where a massive march took place in Taiz, condemning the treachery that occurred in Amran Governorate. This march called for the strengthening of national identity and the national alignment to protect national gains. After that, the national Friday alignment came on August 22, 2014, a month before the black coup and this alignment was in the capital, Sana’a, and it was the strongest march, most crowded and attracting attention in its organization and civilized behavior, as was the case with the February 11 revolution throughout its years. These were the concerns of the Islah Party at the national level.

Second: the Islah Party in Taiz:

Here, we will shed light on the position of the Islah Party and all the patriots towards the city of Taiz, as we have got information about Taiz that encouraged us to write as follows:

1- Coordination with Ibb Governorate:

- The Houthi militia entered Ibb Governorate in mid-October 2014 at the invitation of a leader inside the local authority in Ibb Governorate.

- The people of Taiz felt the gravity of the situation, then the Islah Party in Taiz moved to coordinate with the national forces in the Ibb Governorate, and the consultative meetings were numerous until they came up with a conception aimed at moving the masses peacefully in the two Governorates of Ibb and Taiz under the leadership of the Joint Meeting Parties, youth components and civil society organizations, in addition to activating the role of the sheikhs and social dignitaries and the full coordination between the components of the two Governorates and the mobilization of energies through the Joint Meeting Parties.

- The first meeting actually took place between a number of sheikhs and dignitaries of the two Governorates, and a preliminary contact was also made between the youth components in the two Governorates.

- All components - with the exception of the letting down of the Al-Haq Party - have proven their desire and keenness to confront the expansion of the putschists.

- The components agreed to submit these proposals to the Governor of Taiz Shawqi Hayel.

- However, events accelerated and it seemed that the majority of the army units in Taiz were following the same path as the army, in the betrayed Governorates.

The coup militia proceeded in its malevolent terrorism, destroying homes, violating the sanctities of citizens, killing on accusations, displacement, looting of property and destroying mosques, schools of the Holy Qur’an in the betrayed Governorates. All of these crimes provoked the people of Taiz and made them sense danger.

- The people of Taiz sacrificed their lives and blood, insisting on the sit-in in front of the Special Forces camp (formerly the Central Security), but rather they stayed there for several days and nights, denouncing the coup militia, refusing to let Taiz to be a crossing-bridge to harm the southern Governorates adjacent to Taiz.

- The Islah Party and all the national forces have made efforts in this regard, in addition to its repeated calls to spare Taiz the scourge of war and destruction.

- The Islah Party intensified its contacts with various political and official bodies, calling for intensifying efforts aimed at keeping Taiz as a city of peace, and these contacts resulted in the following:

1- On October 15, 2014, the Secretary-General of the Local Council in the Governorate sent an invitation to the party leaders and some social dignitaries requesting an open meeting with the commander of the fourth region in the Governorate hall of Taiz, but the Secretary-General changed his position at night, where he contacted the Assistant Secretary-General of the Islah Party in Taiz Martyr Sadiq Mansour al-Haidari, who informed him of the cancellation of the meeting with parties and social dignitaries and limiting the meeting to the military and security side only.

Sadiq Mansour replied by saying: It is not good for you, and this position will count against you. How does that happen at a time when you invited people? And I think that the meeting should take place, but rather the Secretary-General justified the fears that might occur during the meeting, and that there were communications warning him of happening chaos inside the hall.

The truth is that the Secretary-General took the advice of Mr. Sadiq and convened the meeting, in which the cohesion of the political and social forces was evident.

2- The role of the fourth military region:

The fourth military region, led by Major General al-Subaihi, who arrived in Taiz because it is located in the area’s theater of operations, took the initiative quickly, and he delivered his speech warning everyone who try to drag Taiz to war, but, he clearly specified the side that wanted to be mobilized with weapons, and from what he said: "My constitutional duty and my national and moral duty to secure Taiz...", until he said: “State agencies must perform their functions and no one outside the state can perform their duties.”

In that meeting on October 16, 2014, Major General al-Subaihi recorded an honorable patriotic position that embodied professionalism and military honor, and even he immortalized a disgrace on the forehead of those with the highest military ranks who had been succumbed to the children of the militia.

3- A naive proposal:

The representative of the coup militia was present and heard the rejection of all those present to the coup militia, so he presented a naive proposal in which he asked to allow the formation of helping revolutionary committees in every institution, then those present in the hall revolted strongly, rejecting and preventing the proposal, which led to forcing the militia representative to back down at this proposal and change the course of his speech in line with the atmosphere of the hall.

4- Betrayals within the local authority:

The leadership of the coup coalition in Sana'a instructed its civilian and military affiliates in Taiz Governorate to prepare the atmosphere for the militia's entry into Taiz.

Governor Shawqi Hayel was outside Yemen at the time, so the local council convened its meeting in the Governorate, and here a clear question was asked, saying, verbatim: What can be done if the coup militia attacked Taiz Governorate? And how can it be faced because it is undoubtedly coming?

It was said: "We do not differ from the other Governorates that avoided confrontation and handed their affairs over to them and avoided fighting themselves."

5- Triple rejection:

All the attendees had their eyes fixed on the three undersecretaries in the Governorate, who are:

- Anas al-Nahari, Islah Party.

- Rashad al-Akhali, the Nasserite Party.

- Muhammad Abdul-Aziz al-Sinwi, Yemeni Socialist Party.

These three undersecretaries had faced with one voice, rejecting and warning all those present of the consequences of defeatism, and that trend fell - apparently - and the evidence is that the leadership of the coup coalition in Sana'a again instructed its members in the leadership of the local authority to take sides and migrate to Ibb Governorate and to Sana'a, and it turned out after that it was a decision the coup coalition had taken it in advance in consultation with its supporters and affiliates in the Governorate, but few of those had reservations about the agreement with the coup militia.

6- Threats of those who spread rumors:

The tongues that spread rumors started warning that after the exodus of the local authority leaders to Sana’a, Taiz did not and will not last more than three weeks.

It is worth noting that one of the displaced leaders stayed in the city of Ibb for two years, not three weeks as they were promoting.. He returned after two years, indignant and cursing all these positions, without exception.

It is worth noting that some leaders, despite the deception, continued to incite the militia and even recruit people for it from their areas.

On the other hand, observers believe that the lack of change in the Governorate of Taiz helped the militia to enter, stressing that the appointment of the three undersecretaries of the Governorate impeded the decision to storm the Governorate first and create a national incubator in Taiz secondly.

7- Forming youth entities to support legitimacy:

The Islah Party and the Joint Meeting Parties spared no effort, as it took the initiative to establish the "Young Men and Women of Taiz", and the goal was to confront the coup, expose the priesthood and support legitimacy.

For the truth and fairness, this component played an active role in every direction, in forums, writings, visiting personalities, exposing the priestly falsehood, leading to the mobilization of everyone to align with Taiz and reject any positions that let Taiz down.

In fairness and as a testimony to history, the young men and women of Taiz made a great and influential effort, and this effort in itself requires long pauses.

8- Societal entities:

In the way of working to spare Taiz the war and the domination of the militia, the Islah Party with the local forces directed towards the establishment of societal entities with the aim of mobilizing energies in the face of the obscurantist project, the most prominent of these blocs are the following:

- Societal Bloc to protect the peace.

- State Support Council.

- Solidarity Council for Taiz dignitaries.

The most beautiful thing about these Blocs is that the different colors of the political spectrum joined them, sensing the danger of the militia, so everyone stood in one trench to confront the militias.

9- An extended meeting:

That wonderful patriotic feeling led to convening an expanded meeting in Taiz Club on April 12, 2015.

The Islah Party interacted with everyone towards uniting the ranks and contributed to the maturation of the Blocs’ vision, leading to:

10- A document adopted by everyone:

This document includes keeping Taiz away from the war and rejecting the coup, and this idea was adopted by the governor of the Governorate.

The document was finalized and signed by political and social parties and entities.

It is worth noting that a representative of the militia was present, and he was asked to sign the document, but he refused, saying: This is a decision in the hands of the leader and the master.

11- Meetings with the General People's Congress Party:

The political forces believed that it is necessary for the GPC to take sides with Taiz, but the GPC had stopped communicating with all the parties in the Governorate.

The meetings with the General People's Congress Party were repeated on the grounds that the dispute between the parties is a political dispute that ends at the protection of Taiz from the dynastic war.

Hope rested on some leaders of the GPC, who had previously refused to cooperate with the putschists. Indeed, a number of leaders of the GPC sided with the homeland and they joined in early at the start of the February 11 revolution.

12- The events accelerated and on Friday came, March 20, 2015, the camps opened their doors to receive the coup militia.

13- On Tuesday, March 24, there was a prior agreement to hold a meeting between the Joint Meeting Parties and their partners and the General People's Congress Party and its allies and the representative of the Houthi group, with the aim of continuing the meetings.

Everyone agreed that the meeting would be at the headquarters of the General People's Congress Party.. The militia representative of was absent from the meeting.

The head of the GPC branch in Taiz made a call with the militia representative urging him to come quickly, but he did not attend. It seemed as if something was being prepared away from the eyes of the national forces that reject the coup.

14- The Joint Meeting Parties issued a statement condemning the opening of the camps to the militia.

It is worth noting that the number of camps surrounding Taiz reached 14 military units.

15- Governor Shawqi called for an emergency meeting of the Security Committee and that this meeting led to the issuance of a statement refusing entry of the militia and that Taiz does not need military or security reinforcements. The commander of the special forces failed to attend, and the governor denounced his position and number of those present agreed with him and they promised the governor to communicate with the man.

16- Helicopters participated in dropping soldiers and equipment to the camps. Two days later, those committed to communicating with the commander of the special forces attended the meeting. And at the meeting, the attendees asked them a question about their position on the developments - the landing of the army and equipment - and the response was: We cannot object to fellow senior commanders who have fallen into the hands of militia children.

Some forces loyal to the militia moved towards setting up roadblocks in the streets and establishing close check-points, rushing to the heights, and commander Mu'aijir al-Barati, commander of the 35th Brigade, had handed over Jabal al-Arous to the militia.

17- Two days before “The Al-Hazm Storm,” the Islah Party met with the leaders of the Party’s branches in the rural Directorates and called them to peaceful rallies in their Directorates. The rallies took place in a number of districts, foremost of which the Al-Shammayatayn Directorate, then the march started in Al-Shammayatayn and removed the check-points The militias tried to disperse the march, but failed, and fired live bullets, resulting in 4 martyrs and 6 wounded. However, the check-points were removed and the militia was expelled from the streets.

On the morning of March 25, Mu'aijir, commander of the 35th Brigade, accompanied by a number of military patrols, set out towards Al-Shamayatayn to reinforce the militia and wave towrds the Al-Shammayatayn to back ou the militias and gesture the banners with peace and security to deceive the massed rallies, but he failed.

At the end of that day, he decided to return from Al-Shammayatayn, but he was afraid that the citizens had cut off his way back, so he changed the path and arrived at the old airport in the city of Taiz, where his place of command. However, the army in the camp decided to stand with the constitution, legitimacy and protection of Taiz, and they expelled Mu'aijir, so he gasped and was expelled.

The truth is that the army's decision in the 35th Brigade represented a force for Taiz and a slap in the face for all the conspirators.

With God's help, we will meet with the Episode (2) under the title: Incubator formation and other issues.