Verily, any political party that has not been subjected to the crimes of violence and terrorism that the Yemeni Islah Party has been subjected to before, also, the source of these terrorist crimes was not one specific group, but several groups and militias, some of which are funded by external parties working to tear Yemen apart into components and dissonant groups with the aim of carrying away the state, the dismantling of national unity, and the establishment of projects of permanent chaos.

The danger of the terrorist operations against the Yemeni Islah Party lies in the possibility that these terrorist operations will establish a new type of terrorism, whose sparks may spread to several countries and cause them to fragment from within, as well as targeting governments, parties, organizations and society in general through supporting and nourishing them by external parties because the culture of violence and terrorism spreads like an epidemic, where these states are destroyed by turbulent militias or groups with permanent projects of violence and chaos.

There are previous examples of what can be described as the contagion of terrorism, for example, when the terrorist organization ISIS took control of large areas of Iraq and Syria, the Houthi militia directly took control of a number of Yemeni Governorates. At a time when an international alliance had been formed to fight ISIS in Iraq and Syria, an Arab Alliance was formed, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to wage war against the terrorist Houthi militia in Yemen.

Thus, it becomes clear that the terrorist militias are affected by each other to the extent of congruence in many practices, ISIS is characterized by absolute hostility to journalists, and the Houthi militia followed the same approach and method for instance. International organizations have classified the Houthi militia as the second organization after ISIS in terms of hostility to journalists. And this is the approach adopted by other militias in Yemen with regard to hostility to journalists, and all these groups and militias direct their terrorization toward the Yemeni Islah Party only.

- The cost of the position supporting the legitimate authority and Al-Hazm Storm:

Militias of violence and terrorism began directing their arrows against the Yemeni Islah Party after it announced its support for the operation of Al-Hazm Storm, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, against the coup of the Houthi militia backed by Iran because that position was a crushing blow to the coup of the Houthi militia and at the same time this position encouraged many Yemeni parties and components to declare their support for the operation of Al-Hazm Storm, which led to the granting of broad popular legitimacy to the Arab military intervention led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Also, that intervention and its obtaining the support of some Yemeni parties gave the popular resistance against the coup of the Houthi militia a political and military cover and confused, at the same time, the Houthi coup militia, which thought that the Islah Party was its main opponent and that its early position in support of operation Al-Hazm Storm encouraged the most important Yemeni parties and components to support the Arab military intervention, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the Houthi militia targeted the leaders of the Islah Party, its members, headquarters, and media by launching a large-scale terrorist campaign, as well as looting the property and homes of the Party leaders and members who left the areas controlled by the Houthi militia in order to avoid its terrorist crimes directed toward them.

The arrows of terrorist groups and militias would not have targeted the Yemeni Islah Party had it not been for its support for the legitimate authority and its support for the operation of Al-Hazm Storm directed against the Iran-backed Houthi coup, especially since the Islah Party had declared its rejection of the chaos of the Houthi militia since its first battles in Amran Governorate and others, as a prelude to entering the capital, Sanaa, and carrying out a coup against legitimate authority. Therefore, the Houthi militia began carrying out large-scale abductions and bombing dozens of mosques, educational institutions, homes, and charities in the Governorates of Saada, Amran, and Hajjah.

After that, the terrorist acts targeting the Islah Party increased immediately after announcing the Party's support for the operation of Al-Hazm Storm. Then, the Houthi militia took control of the Islah Party's visual, print, audio, and electronic media institutions and looted them. The militia also systematically abducted dozens of Islah Party leaders and activists in the capital, Sana'a. These abductions had included some leaders of the Supreme Authority of the Yemeni Islah Party, heads of Departments and Executive Offices, parliamentarians, leaders and activists of different levels, not to mention others who were abducted by the militias in the Governorates of Hudaydah, Dhamar, Ibb and others a few hours after the Islah Party announced its support for the operation of Al-Hazm Storm on 4 April 2015.

According to the Sana’a Center for Human Rights, on that day alone, there were 122 abductions of members, leaders, and activists affiliated with the Islah Party, in addition to the storming of 17 homes, 9 of the Party’s headquarters, looting of 5 civil society organizations affiliated with the Party, and 6 buildings intended for housing students. After that, the abductions and house raids continued in the following days, increasing the numbers and multiplying the violations. And as time passes, the number of leaders, affiliates and activists of the Islah Party who have fallen victim to groups and militias of violence and terrorism increased.

Over the past years, the Yemeni Islah Party has been subjected to terrorism and systematized violence behind which several different and contradictory terrorist groups and militias stand. And all these contradictory militias have agreed to be hostile to the Islah Party with the aim of silencing and neutralizing it from the battle, but rather this made the Party insist more on its support for the legitimate authority and the Arab Alliance in the war directed against the coup and the restoration of the state.

Now, these groups and militias plan to carry out terrorist operations, identify targets, and then execute them easily, taking advantage of the security vacuum and the fragility of the security services in the country. Thus, the Yemeni Islah Party has been and is still paying the price for its national positions that it has shown to support the legitimate authority in its war against the coup of the terrorist Houthi militia and the restoration of the state since the beginning of the war and until this moment. Various terrorist groups and militias conspired against the Islah Party in the liberated and unliberated Governorates.

The following are examples of the most prominent and important terrorist assassinations that have been carried out against leaders of the Yemeni Islah Party in the Governorates of Sana’a, Ibb, and Al-Dhali', bearing in mind that Sana’a Governorate witnessed only one terrorist operation that targeted one of the leaders of the Islah Party because the Islah Party leaders were abducted by the Houthi militia and are still in its prisons, and those who escaped abducting and imprisonment were able to leave the country to abroad or to some of the safer liberated Governorates:

- Sana'a:

- July 27, 2016: The assassination of the Islahi leader Abd al-Qawi al-Jaid, in Bani Bahloul Directorate - Sana’a Governorate, by throwing two grenades at him during the sunset prayer. Four people were killed in this terrorist operation, including the Islahi leader, and 13 others were injured to varying degrees.

- Ibb:

- October 19, 2014: Gunmen affiliated with the Houthi militia blew up the house of the Islahi leader, Ali Badir, in Yarim - Ibb Governorate, killing his son and nephew, then they booby-trapped his son's body after his death.

- February 11, 2016: The assassination of the head of the Islah Party branch, Muhammad al-Shami, and his ten-year-old son, Youssef, in the Hubaish Directorate - Ibb Governorate, as a result of a terrorist operation that targeted him near his house while he was leaving the mosque after performing evening prayer.

- April 2, 2016: Members of the Houthi militia killed Bashir Shihra, the preacher of the Great Mosque in the city of Ibb (the old city), in a terrifying manner in front of his wife and children, and drag his body around the house.

- December 29, 2016: The assassination of the Islahi leader Fahd Mohsen Al-Hashidi with an explosive device planted near his house in Al-Waqash area in Jableh Directorate - Ibb Governorate.

- Al-Dhali':

- April 11, 2016: The martyrdom of Colonel Nasr al-Rubiya, a resident of Al-Dhali' Governorate, in a treacherous ambush that targeted him in an area located between the Governorates of Shabwa and Marib, while he was on his way to follow up on the situation of the resistance. Sheikh Ali al-Matiri, one of the sheiks of the Damt Directorate, was also martyred with him in the same incident.

- October 5, 2018: The assassination of the Islahi leader, journalist Zaki al-Saqladi, by gunmen who shot him while he was in his car in the city of al-Dhali'.

- July 25, 2019: The assassination of Khaled Muhammad Ali Ghaiman, a leader of the Islah Party and director of the Al-Bir Association for Social and Charitable Development, and deputy director of Al-Tadamon Hospital in Al-Dhalea Directorate.

- February 6, 2020: The assassination of the Islahi leader, Abd al-Raqeeb Quzai` in the city of al-Dhali'.

- September 15, 2020: The assassination of the head of the Islah Party branch, Ahmed bin Ahmed Ali after the Maghrib prayer, in Al-Azariq Directorate - Al-Dhali' Governorate.