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The UN and the Yemeni crisis..!

Monday 23 July 2018 / Al-Islah.net - Exclusive

 

   

The Yemeni revolution broke out in 2011, but it could not take power, and the former regime could not end the revolution until the two parties appeared disabled.

 

In a Western reading of the situation, the situation has reached a stage in which Saleh's regime lost many elements of its power and his remaining in power became impossible. At the same time, the revolution did not have a vision of how to transfer power and a detailed program for managing a transitional period. The first step taken by Saleh was to ask the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was accepted by the JMP leadership that was the political engine of the revolution, then the involvement of the United Nations, issuing the first resolution on the Yemeni crisis, and sending Jamal bin Omar as special envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Yemen. The situation in Yemen shifted from local to regional and then to international.

 

 Distinguish between two roles

 

The observer of the United Nations performance notes that there are two spaced roles to the extent of duplication between the UN Secretariat and the UN Security Council.

 

The UN Security Council

 

The position of the UN Security Council in the Yemeni crisis has been logical since the beginning of its intervention. It is committed to the Charter of the United Nations with regard to the human rights aspect, not recognizing the immunity granted to Saleh and his supporters according to the Gulf initiative, the position from the insurgency and preserving the unity of the Republic of Yemen.

 

The UN Security Council Resolutions 2014 in 2011, 2051 in 2012 and the presidential statement issued in 15 February 2013 have continued ignoring the Houthis and the Southern Movement as outlaws and do not classify political parties or civil society organizations.

 

In a statement issued by the Council held in Sana'a in February 2013, two names were mentioned: Ali Abdullah Saleh, describing him as former president, and Ali Salem al-Beid, describing him as the former vice president, that is, his official legal attribute. The statement did not mention the Southern Movement, but in the resolution 2140 of 2014 that issued after the end of the National Dialogue Conference, the Houthis and the Southern Movement were mentioned for the first time and this is a recognition of them based on the recognition of the Yemeni forces at the National Dialogue Conference.

 

UN resolution 2204 issued in February 15, 2015

 

This resolution is one of the most important and most obvious resolutions in describing what Houthi is doing. The Council was more precise in describing the situation. It did not describe the events of 11 February and the June 6, 2015 declaration as a coup, but described them as hostile acts against the people and the legitimate authority in Yemen. This is a more accurate description than a coup, because if it described that as a coup, it would become internal affairs and imposition of a clearly defined authority, but it described that as hostile to arrange dealing with the Houthis as a group that hinders the political transition process adopted by the Council. The resolution also spoke of the hostile actions of the Houthis, such as the bombing of private buildings, mosques, schools and medical facilities.

 

UN Resolution 2216 issued in 2015

 

The Council crowned its resolutions on the situation in Yemen with the last resolution, which put the Yemeni situation under the Article VII, which means the commitment of the United Nations to implement the resolution by force, and this is what the Arab Coalition did, and the Council repeated what it described as the Houthis attack on mosques and public and private institutions.

 

There is constant confirmation of the Council's commitment to the unity, integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Yemen in all Council resolutions. The Council has shown keenness on the unity of the Yemeni State in a clear message to all local, regional and international forces seeking to divide Yemen.

 

 The Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General

 

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had appointed Jamal bin Omar as the Secretary-General's Adviser and Envoy to Yemen. Bin Omar participated in overseeing the negotiations of the Yemeni forces regarding the Gulf Initiative and signing on, and continue in the transitional process of and the National Dialogue Conference.

 

Ben Omar committed two major sins that can be described as the core factors in delivering the crisis to the current situation:

 

1. The transfer of the Houthis from being an outlawed armed rebellion group to an armed group with legitimate aspirations and legitimization of the group politically.

1-1 A visit to Saada on December 13, 2011 and meeting with Abdul Malik al-Houthi despite the declaration of Abdul Malik rejecting the Gulf initiative and his seeking to overthrow it.

1-2 Inviting and engaging the Houthis to the National Dialogue Conference without the requirement of disarming, which opened wide prospects for them to consolidate their legitimacy granted by Ben Omar, to build wider relations and promote them as a group has legitimate aspirations.

1-3 Ben-Omar's possible positions for the Houthis and not to deny their use of weapons and the launch of wars until the fall of the capital and his attempts did not stop in the legitimization of Houthi armed actions.

 

The second envoy, Ismail Ould Cheikh

 

Despite the efforts he made to bring together the parties for the consultation, which in essence was negotiation and his treating for the Authority and the Houthis as equal parties, although he recognized that there were fundamental differences between the legal authority and the rebellion. The more Houthis were hardened, the Ould Cheikh would offer initiatives in favor of the Houthis, despite the failure of negotiations in Kuwait, and he adopted John Kerry's initiative aimed at overthrowing the authority, granted the Houthis full control through withdrawing the authority of the president, replacing his deputy and delegating the authority of the president to the deputy, who is satisfied by Houthi and forming a government without talking about weapons. It was clear that this was an introduction to overthrowing the legal authority and enabling the insurgency to take full power.

 

Although the Houthis took hostile positions against Ould Cheikh, he remained keen to satisfy them.

 

The last Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffith

 

The General Secretariat and its envoys have proved a remarkable fact, which is, the more intense the fighting and the Houthi falls in a quagmire, the General Secretariat and its envoy calls upon each other to stop the war and make proposals.

 

Griffith's efforts succeeded in suspending the military operations aimed at liberating Hodeidah and its seaport under the pretext of the humanitarian situation, although the reality indicates that delaying the liberation of Hodeidah and putting the matter for negotiating is an increase of the human cost representing in using the population as human shields.

 

The broad recruitment of children and young people, the disposition of humanitarian aid, the collection of funds that prolong the war, the smuggling of weapons in all ways through the West Coast; in other words, the liberation of Hodeidah by all measures is less costly at the humanitarian level and is not comparable to the greater cost of suspending operations, and the state of non-war and non-peace, which makes the liberation of Hodeidah more expensive.

 

There is many evidences that the United Nations Secretariat does not abide by UN Security Council resolutions and ignores many of Houthi's actions, which are the cause of a broad humanitarian crisis and that there is no logical explanation for the conduct of the Secretariat and its envoys.

 

The position of the Authority

 

The position of the Authority remains constant through being based to the references and alerting the UN envoy that there are fundamental differences between the legal authority and a rebel group and that the issues should be arranged as follows:

 

Humanitarian issues: These include the release of detainees and abductees. As well as the delivery of aid to those in need wherever they are, noting that the Houthis holds humanitarian aid and acts with that, which leads to the humanitarian crisis.

 

Security issues: It means pulling out of cities and handing over weapons and state institutions. 

 

Political issues: The arrangement for the establishment of a national unity government and not the synchronization as presented by Ould Cheikh since the beginning of his duties as an envoy.

 

The results

 

There is a wide discrepancy between the UN Security Council on the one hand and the United Nations Secretariat represented by the Secretary-General's Envoy.

 

There is use of the Houthis as a bargaining paper between the EU and Iran, and the UN Secretary-General's Envoy Martin Griffith enjoys broad European support.

 

There is a wide gap between the authority and the UN envoy.

 

The Authority is depends on law, as being a legal authority, and the three references representing the rock that various attempts are collided with to achieve the goals of the Houthis carried by the UN envoy.

 

The different actors cannot go beyond the references and all they do is prolong the crisis and the war.

 

Muhammad Abdul Kareem

 

Keywords

#UN #Yemen